Tight corners of “great” and “regional” powers

The Karabakh conflict appeared to be the first serious challenge for the EU Caucasian policy. The beginning of a large-scale war between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the following occupation of 20 percent of Azerbaijani territory must have defined the European attitude towards these devastating events, because it was obvious that international agreements in the sphere of European security were violated. However, despite this, the Europeans preferred to analyze the events not from the point of view of the Helsinki Agreement, but from the neutral point of view, intending not to hurt any party in the conflict.

In the 90s such a position was profitable for Europe, because Baku and Erevan, trying to achieve the conflict settlement in the way beneficial for each of them, along with other centers of global politics (Washington and Moscow) appealed to the Europeans, who, as if attracting Azerbaijan and Armenia to be the part of their sphere of influence, contributed greatly to the admission of these states to almost all existing European political structures and institutions. In fact it was clear that for these “concessions” the Europeans will demand from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia to modernize their political system so that it could be controlled by the Europeans. And if Tbilisi accepted the terms, Baku and Erevan preferred to choose their own path. But in word they continued to follow democratic and European principles. The Europeans in turn pretended that despite some errors Azerbaijan and Armenia construct the democracy. The conflict is still unsolved though great powers and regional leaders like Turkey are still making great peace-making efforts...
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